Cinematic editorial photograph of a weathered oil tanker plowing through a cold slate-gray sea at dawn, a large Russian tricolor flag sharply visible from the s

Russian shadow fleet · 2022–2026 · A state-backed maritime system.

A Flag, Not a Convenience

More than 213 Western-sanctioned tankers were flying the Russian flag after 98 reflagged in 2025–26, according to Windward.

Sovereign control, not new proxies

After 2022, Russia began insourcing the services that keep a fleet operational. The aim is sovereign control—working around the International Group of P&I Clubs, which covers roughly 90% of global oceangoing tonnage.

Windward reports that 98 tankers reflagged to Russia in 2025–2026, lifting its total above 213—versus Cameroon’s 157 and Sierra Leone’s 98—among more than 1,000 Western-sanctioned tankers.

Source note: The exact flag counts are single-sourced to Windward. Independent estimates put Russia’s specialized oil fleet above 1,000 vessels and the broader global dark fleet above 1,300 by 2026, but these are differently defined populations and are not directly comparable.

₽300B

RNRC authorized capital · raised March 3, 2022 to cover sanctioned companies

From ₽71B · Reuters alone reported ₽750B in guaranteed capital (single-sourced)

Domestic risk and certification backstops

Sovcomflot: Ingosstrakh insurance → RNRC reinsurance
VSK: Reportedly uses the same RNRC reinsurance structure
RMRS: Expelled from IACS on March 11, 2022; continued independently classifying Russian and Russia-linked ships
IRClass policy: Stopped accepting US-, EU- or UK-sanctioned vessels from early 2023
IRClass removals: 235 tankers and gas carriers · about 13M dwt — Arun Sharma claim, single-sourced

In April 2022, roughly 90–92 Sovcomflot tankers and LNG carriers moved to Dubai-registered SCF Ship Management, later renamed Sun Ship Management. After EU sanctions on Sun, 45 tankers began shifting in July 2023 to Oil Tankers SCF MGMT FZCO.

Sovcomflot first denied the Sun connection, then acknowledged it had been a group company, saying the added restrictions “did not add much.” K&O Ship Management, Fornax and Stream further illustrate the UAE web: continuity of control through Dubai, not an independent foreign substitute.

2035

Zvezda’s reported shipbuilding horizon

State-backed industrial capacity is harder to replace—or sanction—than individual hulls and shell companies.

Zvezda turns fleet replacement into domestic capacity

State backing: Rosneft · Rosneftegaz · Gazprombank
2020 milestone: Vladimir Monomakh — Russia’s first domestically built Aframax
Reported April 2026 plan: 26 Northern Sea Route cargo vessels plus LNG carriers; order-book detail is single-sourced
Reported August 2026 LNG fleet: 25 vessels; at least 8 acquired secondhand in six months (acquisition count single-sourced)
Zvezda LNG contribution: 2 built · 4 under construction

Target the harder-to-replace chokepoints

The EU added 189 vessels in May 2025, taking its listed total to 342—yet the source says more than half the known dark fleet remained untouched. That is a coverage gap, not an argument against vessel sanctions.

Policy must also target RNRC’s state-backed reinsurance, RMRS’s classification authority, the Russian flag registry and Zvezda’s build capacity. These are harder to replace overnight than a vessel manager or convenience flag. Several exact fleet and capacity figures remain single-sourced.